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..... IDEALIST ..... CORONA .....  .....

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24 FEB 1970

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Special Activities

SUBJECT : Proposed U-2R Coverage of Chinese Strategic Missile Targets

1. This memorandum discusses two IDEALIST/TACKLE conceptual routes designed to provide photographic coverage of Chinese Communist Strategic Missile targets of high priority interest to the U. S. Intelligence Community. It is recommended that we forward these routes to the 303 Committee for approval should the Warsaw talks break down or should other unforeseen actions make submission appropriate.

2. For the past several years the development by the Chinese Communist of a strategic missile capability has been of great concern to the U. S. Intelligence Community and has enjoyed a relatively high collection priority.

The data which is available is based primarily on CORONA satellite photography which due to technical and environmental factors is less than adequate for a firm understanding of the Chinese program.

3. Although it is technically feasible to alter the "normal" CORONA orbit profiles to provide increased coverage, we believe that the U-2R reconnaissance system can make a significant contribution to the assessment of the Chinese strategic missile program. The U-2R would also have several distinct advantages over satellite photography:

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a. It can be programmed to fly when weather conditions are optimum.

b. The U-2R can be programmed to cover widely dispersed facilities such as those at the Shuang-Chung-Tzu Missile Test Range which are rarely observed in KEYHOLE photography.

c. The U-2R camera is technically capable of providing ground resolution [REDACTED] of these areas with considerably greater coverage of unique target areas due to our capability to program the U-2R.

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4. The proposed conceptual routes are provided in Attachments A and B. Route A provides complete coverage of almost all of the known launch facilities, including Launch Complex B, at the Shuang-Cheng-Tzu Missile Test Range together with the rangehead Instrumentation Facilities. In addition, the SAWRF's at Shuang-Cheng-Tzu and the Yumen Plutonium Production Plant are covered. Several airfields and military installations of COMIREX interest are also programmed.

5. Route B provides coverage of three high priority targets in Central China -- Peking Guided Missile (GM) Development and Production Center, Peking GM Plant at Nan-Yuan, and the Hu-Ho-Haote Solid Motor Test Facility. In addition, airfields, military and naval installation, and SAWRFs along the programmed track would also be covered.

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
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6. In summary, the U-2R is capable of significantly supplementing satellite photography of these installations as well as providing needed data on the facilities which are not readily available from satellite photography. Recommend, therefore, that you approve these conceptual routes for consideration by the 303 Committee, at a time you deem appropriate.

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



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DATE: 30 Jan 70



*Office of the DD/S&T*

TO: Acting Director, OSA

SUBJECT:


REMARKS:

Bob:

In connection with your study of possible Chinese missions, you will find the attached a useful input.

Don Steininger

Attachment:



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